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ABSTRACT 
The revolution of information and communication technology has 
transformed the world into different shape, including Muslim 
world. This technology in the form of internet does not merely 
have the democratizing potential for Muslim world, but also has 
created a new public sphere and new Islamic authority. This paper 
discusses the role of internet as played by Muslim religious 
movement, especially Salafism in Indonesia. Using textual 
analysis of data collected from their websites, this article argues 
that the internet as modern technology of information and 
communication has helped Salafism rise to the public to show 
their ideological and doctrinal stances as well as to challenge their 
enemies such as Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberat), 
Shiah, and so on. Through the internet too, this movement 
respond to such contemporary issues as terrorism, earthquake and 
others. This means that although orthodox in doctrine and 
attitude, this movement can benefit from the internet very much 
for its missionary purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The revolution of Information and Communication Technology has been 
transforming the face of the Muslim world within the last decade. The 
explosion of new media, particularly the internet, has created the global rise 
of “cyber-Islamic environment”1 and “Islamic information revolution.”2 A 
substantial number of studies have been conducted to explain this emerging 
field of cyber Islam in the last decade. Most of these studies have been 
devoted to explain how the internet has impacted on Islam, Muslims, and 
                                                
1 Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (London: 
Pluto Press, 2003). 
2 Gary R. Bunt, “Towards an Islamic Information Revolution?” Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth 
Poole and John E. Richardson (London:  I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
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Muslim states. Scholars assert that “digital revolution”3 transforms global 
Muslim networks,4 changes the public sphere in Muslim countries and the 
West for Muslim minorities,5 and empowers the powerless and marginalized 
groups such as Muslim women.6  
Other scholars emphasize the democratizing potential of the internet 
for the Muslim world in that the new media has created a new Islamic 
public sphere and new Islamic authority that undermine traditional 
structures of religious authority.7 The internet has challenged state 
authority and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East,8 and even has 
contributed to the success of revolution in the Middle East.9  
 Undoubtedly, such literature has provided important insights into 
the role and impact of the global rise of cyber-Islamic environments on 
Muslim societies and states. However, it seems that the subject of inquiry 
of the existing studies has been mainly focused on the issues of terrorism, 
radicalism and Islamic politics from the perspective of security studies.10 
                                                
3 Ali Mazrui and Alaim Mazrui, “The Digital Revolution and the New Reformation,” Harvard International 
Review, 23: 1 (2001): 52–55. 
4 Stefano Allievi and Jorgen Nielsen, Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across 
Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
5 Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “The Public Sphere and Muslim Identities,” European Journal 
of Sociology, 43: 1 (2002): 92–115; Bunt, “Towards an Islamic Information Revolution?”; Peter Mandaville, 
“Reimagining the Ummah? Information Technology and the Changing Boundaries of Political Islam,” Islam 
Encountering Globalization, ed. Ali Mohammadi (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); idem, Global Political Islam 
(London: Routledge, 2007). 
6 Alexis Kort, “Dar-al-cyber Islam: Women, Domestic Violence and the Islamic Reformation on the World 
Wide Web,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25: 3 (2005): 363–383; Fatima Mernissi, “The Satellite, the 
Prince, and Shaherazad: Women as Communicators in Digital Islam,” On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the 
Global Era, ed. F. Nouraie-Simone (New York: The Feminist Press, 2005); Bernardi, Chiara. “Saudi Bloggers, 
Women Issues and NGOs,” Arab Media and Society, 11 (2010).  
7 See, for example, Jon W. Anderson, “New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam,” 
Social Research, 70: 3 (2003): 887-906; Mohammed El-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis,  “Divergent Identities in the 
Virtual Islamic Public Sphere: A Case Study of the English Discussion Forum ‘Islamonline,’” Journal of Arab and 
Muslim Media Research, 5: 1 (2012); Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age; Vit Sisler, “The Internet and the 
Construction of Islamic Knowledge in Europe,” Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 1: 2 (2007); 
Nabil Echchaibi, “From Audio Tapes to Video Blogs: The Delocalisation of Authority in Islam,” Nations and 
Nationalism, 17: 1 (2011): 25–44.  
8 Liora Hendelman-Baavur, “Promises and Perils of Weblogistan: Online Personal Journals and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran,” MERIA: The Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2007; Pardis Mahdawi, 
“Meeting, Mating, and Cheating Online in Iran,” ISIM Review, 19 (2007); Sadiq M. Sait, et. al., “Impact of 
Internet Usage in Saudi Arabia: A Social Perspective,” International Journal of Information Technology and Web 
Engineering, 2: 2 (2007); Deborah L. Wheeler, The Internet in the Middle East: Global Expectations and Local 
Imaginations in Kuwait (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 
9 Khamis Khamis and  Katherine Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic 
Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance,” Arab Media and Society, 14 (2011). Available at: 
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=769; Sean Aday, et. al., New Media and Conflict after the Arab 
Spring (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2012); Miriyam Aouragh, “Tweeting Like a Pigeon: The 
Internet in the Arab Revolutions,” CyberOrient, 6: 2 (2012); Aziz Douai, “‘Seeds of Change’ in Tahrir Square and 
Beyond: People Power or Technological Convergence?” American Communication Journal, 15: 1 (2013); Philip 
N. Howardand Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
10 Douai, “‘Seeds of Change’ in Tahrir Square and Beyond;” El-Nawawy and Khamis, “Divergent Identities 
in the Virtual Islamic Public Sphere;” Khamis and  Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution;” Dana 
Janbek, “The Use of the Internet as a Communication Medium by Extremist Muslim Groups: A Content Analysis 
of Websites,” Open Access Dissertations (2009). Available at: 
http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/273; Shima D. Keene, “Terrorism and the Internet: A 
Double-edged Sword,” Journal of Money Laundering Control, 14: 4 (2011): 359-370. 
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The strategic interests in the global “War on Terror” may have contributed 
to the scholars and security analysts’ serious attention to the relationship 
between new media and Islamic politics and radicalism in the Muslim world 
and Western countries where Islam is minority religion. As a consequence, 
issues other than terrorism and political Islam have not been adequately 
explored. For example, little research has been conducted to examine the 
relationship between transnational Islamic movements and the internet, 
except the ones that focus on terrorist and radical organizations like al-
Qaeda.11 
 Moreover, the predominant focus of the literature has been on 
cyber-Islam in the Middle East or Arab world12 and Muslim minorities in 
the North America and Europe.13 Linguistically, the current research on the 
internet and Islam is mostly limited to Arabic and English websites, social 
media or internet forums. Few studies have been conducted by academic 
scholars to study cyber Islam in Southeast Asia and Africa.14 Yet, most of 
these works still focus on the predominant subject of inquiry of the current 
research on cyber Islam, namely Islamic radicalism and new media.15 
Such disregard may be due to the assumption among scholars, either 
Muslims or non-Muslims, and public, which is articulated by media, that 
                                                
11 George Michael, “Adam Gadahn and Al-Qaeda’s Internet Strategy,” Middle East Policy, 16: 3 (2009): 
135-152; Michael Kenney, “Beyond the Internet: Mētis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for 
Islamist Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 2 (2010): 177-197; Keene, “Terrorism and the 
Internet.” 
12 Rasha A. Abdulla, The Internet in the Arab World: Egypt and Beyond (New York:  Peter Lang Publishing, 
2007); Mahjoob Zweiri and Emma Murphy, The New Arab Media: Technology, Image and Perception (Ithaca: 
Ithaca Press, 2010). 
13 Mandaville, “Reimagining the Ummah?;” Poole, Elizabeth. “Networking Islam: The Democratising 
Potential of New Technologies in Relation to Muslim Communities,” The Public, 9: 1 (2002): 51-64; Göran 
Larsson, “The Death of a Virtual Muslim Discussion Group: Issues and Methods in Analyzing Religion on the 
Net,” Online–Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet, 1: 1 (2005); Patrick  Martin and Sean Phelan, 
“Representing Islam in the Wake of September 11: A Comparison of US Television and CNN Online Message 
Board Discourses,” Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, 20: 3 (2002): 263-269; Simona Hlavacova, “US-
based Islamist Network: Presence in Cyberspace and Online Projects,” Masaryk University Journal of Law and 
Technology, 1: 2 (2007); Smeetha Mishra and Gaby Semaan, “Islam in Cyberspace: South Asian Muslims in 
America Log In,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 54: 1 (2001): 87-101. 
14 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Online Fatwa in Indonesia: From Fatwa Shopping to Googling a Kiai,’ Expressing 
Islam, Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008); 
Muhamad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia,” The American Journal 
of Islamic Social Sciences, 22: 1 (2005): 1-26; Eva F. Nisa, “The Internet Subculture of Indonesian Face-veiled 
Women,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, 16: 3 (2013): 241-255; Johan Fischer, “‘We Shift the Channel 
When Mahathir Appears’: The Political Internet and Censorship in Malaysia,” Akademika, 75 (2009): 43-63; 
Noor Hazarina Hashim, et. al., “Islam and Online Imagery on Malaysian Tourist Destination Websites,” Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12 (2007): 1082–1102; Shirley S. Ho, et. al., “Muslim Surfers on the 
Internet: Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour to Examine the Factors Influencing Engagement in Online 
Religious Activities, New Media Society, 10: 1 (2008): 93–113; Randolph Kluver and Pauline Hope Cheong, 
“Technological Modernization, the Internet and Religion in Singapore,” Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 12 (2007): 1122-1142; John Chesworth, “A study of Selected Islamic Internet Sites in East 
Africa,” Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 1: 2 (2007). 
15 Birgit Brauchler, “Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace,” 
The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 15: 3 (2004): 267-285; idem, “Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity 
and the Internet in the Moluccan Conflict,” Indonesia, 75 (2003): 123-151; Merlyna Lim, “Islamic Radicalism and 
anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet,” Policy Studies, 18 (2005); Hui, Jennifer Yang. “The 
Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33: 2 
(2010): 171-191. 
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Islam is identical to Arab world and Muslims are synonymous with Arab 
people. Non-Arab Muslims, who constitute the majority of Muslims in the 
world, are often overlooked because they are considered to be in periphery 
compared to the Middle East, which is traditionally regarded as ‘the centre 
of the Muslim world’ from the perspective of Orientalism. This overlooking 
may have attributed to the “disregard of the Muslim world in East and 
Southeast Asia”16 or “Ummah in the East,” whereas Muslims in Southeast 
Asia with Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world represent 
the majority of Muslim population.  
   This article attempts to address these gaps by examining the 
internet usage by contemporary Islamic movements in Indonesia. For this 
purpose, it focuses its analysis on Salafism in Indonesia and its embrace of 
the internet for promoting and articulating collective identity.17 This choice 
was based on, first, it is interesting that although it is theologically 
considered ultra-conservative, Salafism is technologically a modern 
movement as seen its eagerness to engage with Information and 
Communication technologies like the internet, and second, the fact that 
Salafism is one of the fastest-growing Islamic movements in contemporary 
Indonesia, a non-Arab Muslim country with the largest Muslim population 
in the world. The article asks the following principle questions: In what 
ways are the internet is employed by the Salafists to promote and articulate 
their collective identity and what is the implication of this usage for their 
movement?  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The use of the top search engine Google, which was voted “Most 
Outstanding Search Engine” and ranked as the preferred search engine by 
www.searchenginewatch.com and the search terms “Salaf Indonesia” and 
“Salafi Indonesia” revealed that the online presence of Salafism in 
Indonesia is seen, among others, in the hundreds of websites operated and 
maintained by its proponents with links to local and global similar 
websites. For the purpose of this article, the analysis was focused on a 
purist Salafi website www.salafy.or.id. The choice was based on that the 
fact the website represents the mainstream Salafi movement, which was 
expected to help us understand better the relationship between Islamic 
movements and new media technology.   
The required data were collected through online observation and 
web archiving of the selected websites. Postings posted by the web 
                                                
16 Wai-Yip Ho, “Islam, China and the Internet: Negotiating Residual Cyberspace between Hegemonic 
Patriotism and Connectivity to the Ummah,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 30: 1 (2010): 64.  
17 For the discussion on the origin and the development of Salafism in Indonesia, see 17 Noorhaidi, “Laskar 
Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in post-New Order Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation, The 
University of Utrecht, 2005. 
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administrator and contributors were collected from the Salafi website to 
examine the ways the Salafists use the internet. Such postings were 
analysed for topic, tone of arguments, and type of response. The 
methodology involved a textual analysis of the collected postings to 
uncover categories of the Salafi use of the internet. In this article, the text 
comprises the Salafi website including articles, postings and images. I 
allowed the categories to emerge from the collected postings base upon 
similarities and differences. As Patton said, “the patterns, themes, and 
categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data 
rather than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis.”18  
 The analysis involved the first step of initial reading of the postings 
to develop a general sense of their content or a “long preliminary soak”19 in 
the web texts, which were suspected as to have answers to the research 
questions. The next step was to develop categories of the ways the Salafi 
employ the internet. Then, I reread the postings and articles and placed 
them into one of the defined categories. When a posting reflected two or 
more categories, I placed it into a category based on its most appropriate 
content. The postings and articles were classified in the following way: 
ideological, polemical, communicative, and contextual uses of the internet. 
These analytical stages used the original texts in Indonesian. Only material 
quoted in this article and the title of postings were translated by me into 
English.  
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. The Salafi Use of Internet 
The website www.salafy.or.id belongs to the purist Salafi community, the 
mainstream Salafism in Indonesian.20 It is run by supporters of the purist 
Salafism in their attempts to articulate Salafi collective identity. This can 
be seen in the board of supervisors and contributors that come from the 
authorities of Indonesian branch of purist Salafism such as Muhammad 
Umar As-Sewed and Luqman Baabduh. The website also extensively posts 
the writings by the authorities of purist Salafism in the Middle East such as 
Ibn Baz of Saudi Arabia and Rabi al-Madkhali of Yemen and its local 
contributors largely make them the main references for their articles. All 
this is consistent with a report by International Crisis Group21 and a study 
                                                
18 Cited in Linda A. LaSalle, “Exploring Campus Intolerance: A Textual Analysis of Comments concerning 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual People,” A paper presented at the Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, San Francisco, April 1992. 
19 Federico Pablo Feldstein and Caroline Acosta-Alzuru, “Argentinean Jews as Scapegoat: A Textual 
Analysis of the Bombing of AMIA,” Journal of Communication Inquiry, 27 (2003): 152-170. 
20 For further information and analysis of other Salafi groups, see Wiktorowicz (2004), Noorhaidi, “Laskar 
Jihad;” and Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 83-94. 
21 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix’, 
Asia Report, 83 (2004). 
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by Noorhaidi22 and Hasan23 that the purist Salafis of Indonesian branch 
established www.salafy.o.id as their own website. 
 The website was designed as a mainly text-based and easy-to-use 
website with light green (believed to be a representative colour of Islam) as 
its background colour. Its homepage displays a title of the website ‘Salafy 
Online Situs Salafi Ahlussunah wal Jamaah’ (Salafi Online, the website of 
the followers of Sunnah and Community), the term “As-Salafy” written in 
Roman and Arabic scripts, and a subtitle “Meniti jejak al-salaf al-salih” 
(Following the footsteps of the Pious Forefathers). Using Indonesian as the 
main language, the website appears in the following main structure: First, 
main menu that contains sections “Home”, “Tentang Kami” (About Us), 
“Mengapa Harus Salafy” (Why Should be Salafy), “Info Kajian Salafy” 
(Information about Salafi Studies), “Arabic Tool”, “Download Centre”, 
“Forum Kita (Our Forum), “Free Webmail”, and “Kontak Kami” (Contact 
Us). Second, articles that are categorized as “Aqidah” (faith), “Manhaj” 
(method), “Fiqh” (Islamic jurisprudence), “Fatwa-fatwa” (fatwa>s: religious 
opinions), and “Info Dakwah” (Information about Islamic mission). Lastly, 
links and affiliations that connect the Salafi website to other local and 
global Salafi websites. 
 The articles posted on the website were written in Indonesian by 
Indonesian purist Salafi figures such as Umar Sewed, Luqman Baabduh, 
and Abu Hamzah with references to the global Salafi authorities in the 
Middle East. The website also includes the translated writings and fatwa>s 
by the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities such as Muh}ammad Nashir al-Di>n 
al-Alba>ni>, Rabi>‘ al-Madkhali>, ‘Abd Alla>h bin Baz, Shaykh ‘Uthaymin, 
Muqbil al-Wadi>‘i>, and Fauza>n S{a>lih}. 
 
B. Promoting Salafi Ideology  
There is no doubt that the Salafi community uses the internet as a medium 
for promoting their Salafi identities. The website’s statement reveals that 
the Salafi community regards the internet as a medium of da‘wa Salaf 
(Salafi mission) aimed at propagating and communicating the Salafi 
identities (see “Tentang Kami” section). First of all, this sort of use is 
expressed in the utilization of website by the Salafists to post articles and 
fatwa>s regarding the basic principles of Salafi ideology including the ways 
of Salaf, dress code and behaviour, jihad, and politics. 
 
1.  Manhaj Salaf 
The Salafis communicate their Salafi principles by posting articles written 
by Indonesian Salafis, with the extensive reference to the Middle Eastern 
Salafi ideologues, and writings by the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities 
                                                
22 Noorhaidi, “Laskar Jihad.” 
23 Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia,” 83-94.  
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translated into Indonesian. The postings deal with the manhaj al-salaf al-
s}a>lih} (the way of the righteous predecessors), which is believed as the only 
right way to understand and implement Islamic teachings. It is believed as 
the best way of understanding and practicing Islam because they were 
exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad, his companions (sah}a>bah), those 
who followed them (ta>bi‘i>n), and a generation after who followed them 
(ta>bi‘ al-ta>bi‘i>n). They were the predecessors (salaf, singular; asla>f, plural), 
the early generations of Muslims, that were believed to have the best 
methods in understanding and practicing Islam under the direct guidance of 
the Prophet. 
In their postings, the Salafis assert that their mission is da‘wah 
salafiyyah (Salafi propagation) on which their understanding and practices 
of Islam are based and to which they call other Muslims. This conviction is 
based on religious texts, the Quranic verses and the Sunnah, that are 
regarded as to say about the early generations of Muslim as  the perfect 
models of understanding and observing Islam. The most refereed texts 
include the Quranic verse saying that “Ye are the best of peoples, evolved 
for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and 
believing in Allah” (Surah A<li ‘Imra>n: 110) and the Sunnah narrated by 
Bukha>ri> and Muslim that the prophet Muhammad said “The best people are 
my generation, then a generation after, and then a generation after”. 
Therefore, the Salafis believe that they are the saved among various 
Muslim groups based on their understanding of the Sunnah says “The Jews 
split up into seventy one sects and the Christians split up into seventy two 
sects. My people will split up into seventy three sects which all of them are 
in the Fire, except one in Paradise. It was asked: “Who is that?” he replied: 
“That which I and my companions are upon” (see ‘The essence of the Salafi 
mission’;24 ‘The method of the forefathers’25). 
Like most Muslims, the Salafis emphasize that the very core of their 
mission is a call for tawh}i>d (monotheism; the oneness of God) and 
avoidance of shirk (polytheism), the main messages of all prophets. They 
highly emphasize the importance of tawh}i>d in Islamic faith and the danger 
of shirk (see ‘the place and urgency of tawh}i>d in Islam’;26 ‘Beware of 
shirk’;27 ‘About tawh}i>d’28). But, what distinguishes them from the Muslim 
majority is their particular strict ways in understanding and practicing the 
doctrine of tawh}i>d in that they attempt robustly to purify in belief and 
practice the doctrine from all forms of un-Islamic innovations and 
influences. They believe that the prophet Muhammad began and finished 
                                                
24 Original title: ‘Hakikat dakwah Salafiyyah’(Indonesian).  
25 Original title: ‘Manhaj Salaf’. 
26 Original title: ‘Kedudukan tauhid dalam Islam dan urgensinya’. 
27 Original title: ‘Awas, bahaya syirik merenggut anda’. 
28 Original title: ‘Jenis-jenis tauhid’. 
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his mission with the tawh}i>d doctrine (see ‘Monotheism, the mission of all 
prophets’29). 
In a posted article, the Salafis elaborate the method of Salafism that 
involves two steps. First, tas}fiyyah that refers to purification Islam from 
bid‘ah (innovations). This step encompasses the movement of purifying 
Islam from all forms of beliefs, thoughts, and practices that have no basis in 
the religious texts and no precedence in the practice of the prophet and the 
early Muslim generations. Second step is tarbiyah that involves education 
of the pure Islam for Muslims. This aims to educate Muslims with the pure 
Islam and cultivate them to live their lives with the true Islam (see ‘The 
method of the Salafi mission’30).  
By posting articles in their website, the Salafis attempt to promote 
the idea of al-wala>’ wa al-barra>’, another important element of their 
ideology. Al-wala>’ (loyalty; love) means that a Muslim must love, help, and 
defend the people of tawh}i>d (true monotheism) and al-barra>’ means that he 
must despise, denounce and desert the people of shirk (associating God 
with others). This doctrine requires the clear-cut distinction between 
Muslims and non-Muslim, between the world of believers and that of 
unbelievers. For the Salafis, the doctrine includes a prohibition for Muslims 
to imitate non-Muslims’s traditions and ways of life such as clothing. They 
believe that the al-wala>’ wa al-barra>’ doctrine has basis in the religious 
texts (e.g. the Quran, al-Mumtah}anah: 1, 4; al-Ma>’idah:51; al-Tawbah: 23; 
al-Muja>dilah: 22) and was practiced by Abraham, the father of monotheistic 
religions, and Muhammad. But, it seems that the application of al-wala>’ wa 
al-barra>’ is confined to those who follow or defy the methods of the Salaf as 
the perceived by the Salafis (see ‘al-wala>’ wa al-barra>’ is a necessity’;31 
‘Loyalty and enmity that are required by shari>ah 1-5’32). 
 
2.  Dress code, beards and men-women relationship 
Like other fundamentalist groups, the purist Salafi community are 
characterised by high discipline in that their behaviours are regulated by 
strict interpretation of religious texts. Through their website, the Salafis 
emphasize the importance of following the ways the prophet Muhammad 
and the early generations of Muslims lived their lives. So, they grow their 
beards and shave their moustache and persuade Muslims to do so because 
they believe they are religious obligations written in the valid religious 
texts and practiced by the prophet and his companions. The Salafi men 
prefer Arabic style of dress such as jalabiyya (flowing robes), ima>mah 
(turbans), and trousers right to their ankle,  and women appear in niqa>b 
                                                
29 Original title: ‘Dakwah tauhid, dakwah para nabi dan rasul’. 
30 Original title: ‘Metode dakwah salafiyyah’. 
31 Original title: ‘Al-wala wal bara, sebuah keharusan’. 
32 Original title: ‘Loyalitas dan kebencian yang disyariatkan’. 
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(flowing black dress and veil) covering their whole body. In the eyes of the 
Salafis, this is a religious command aimed as a way to distinguish Muslims 
from pagan people and non-Muslims. Muslims are prohibited from 
imitating them in any aspects of their life including personal affairs such as 
beards and dress code (see ‘Let your beards grow’33). 
 In their website, the Salafis promote a belief that men-women 
relationship must be regulated by religious rules. Like Muslim majority, the 
Salafis believe that adultery (zina>) is strongly prohibited by God as written 
in the religious texts. But, they go further to close anything that brings 
people to commit adultery. So, they strongly oppose ‘liberal’ relationship 
between man and woman such as dating and strongly argue for the 
importance of separation of men and women in public places. Even, they 
believe that watching TV and films is prohibited as it can persuade people 
to do adultery (see ‘Watch out! Going out is a step to adultery 1-2’34). 
 
3.  Terrorism and jihad 
For the Salafis, the internet has become a medium to repudiate those who 
wage jihad, but actually use it for their own interests and purposes. In their 
opinions, those involved in 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings in 2003 and 
2005 were not muja>hid (the holy way fighters) or shahi>d (martyr). Rather, 
they were terrorists who created disorder, damage and disruption among 
society and had nothing to do with jihad as required in Islam. The Salafis 
call them the narrow-minded people and the ignorant of the true jiha>d. 
Referring to Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymin of Saudi Arabia, one of the main Salafi 
authorities, the Salafis assert that jihad cannot reduced to a single 
understanding as it has multiple meanings. First, jiha>d al-nafs (self-jiha>d): 
conquering one’s self in one’s attempts by earning religious knowledge to 
obey God’s command and oppose those who call against Him. Second, jiha>d 
al-muna>fiqi>n: fighting against hypocrites with true religious knowledge, not 
weapon. Lastly, jiha>d al-kuffa>r: fighting against unbelievers who attack 
Muslim territory and declare a war to Muslims (see ‘Islamic perspective of 
terrorism’35; ‘Misunderstanding jiha>d’36). 
The Salafis argue further that jiha>d in terms of waging a war cannot 
be declared unless it meets the required conditions. First, when a Muslim is 
facing an enemy in a battlefield. Second, when a Muslim country is under 
attack by enemy. Third, the ima>m (the leader of Muslim country) declares 
the jihad and commands all Muslims to do so. Finally, when armed jihad is 
regarded as a necessity solution under certain conditions and 
considerations. The Salafis believe that current Muslim world does not 
                                                
33 Original title: ‘Biarkan jenggot anda tumbuh’. 
34 Original title: ‘Awas! Pacaran = mendekati zina 1 and 2’. 
35 Original title: ‘Makna terorisme dalam pandangan Islam’. 
36 Original title: ‘Salah kaprah dalam jihad’.  
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meet the required conditions to wage a military jihad and those who were 
involved in violent attacks on non-Muslims are not mujahid, but rather 
terrorists. Hence, these people, for the Salafis, are not the followers of the 
manhaj al-salaf, a method implemented by the Prophet and the early 
Muslim generations, in understanding and practicing jihad (see ‘Disclosing 
the thoughts of a master of  terrorism’37; ‘How to respond properly to Bali 
bombing’38; ‘They are terrorists’39). 
 
4.  Politics 
Through their website, the Salafis also disseminate their political ideas. 
They believe that those who get involved in politics as a means to establish 
an Islamic state are not the followers of the Salaf. They argue that 
ideological basis used by these people to justify their political activities is a 
forbidden religious innovation (bid’ah) that has no precedence in the 
practice of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims. 
This ideology, known as tawhid hakimiyyah, refers to a belief that 
hakimiyyah (sovereignty) belongs only to Allah and governance can only be 
ascribed to Him so that it is one of the main elements of tawhid (true 
monotheism). The Salafis reject this conception arguing that it is a bid’ah 
created as a political weapon to support the political tendency of the 
politico Salafi groups such as Ihkwan al-Muslimin. Such a doctrine implies 
the necessity of takfir (declaring a Muslim as an infidel), a doctrine that is 
also rejected by the Salafis. To support their argument, the Salafis employ a 
fatwa issued by Hai’ah Kibar al-Ulama (The committee of prominent Salafi 
ulama) of Saudi Arabia saying that tawhid hakimiyyah is a bid’ah that no 
one of ahl al-sunnah (the supporters of Sunnah) agrees with it (see ‘There is 
no such a tawhid hakimiyyah in Islam’40; ‘More about tawhid 
hakimiyyah’41). 
 The apolitical stance of the purist Salafis is seen in their postings 
regarding the   doctrine of the prohibition of rebellion against a ruler. 
According to the Salafis, it is a religious obligation for Muslims to “listen 
to and obey” a ruler, no matter he is good or bad, just or unjust, as long as 
he does not order to oppose against the God’s laws. Muslims are not 
allowed to oppose the ruler of a country where they can observe their faith 
peacefully. They argue that any forms of opposition against a ruler ranging 
from criticism, demonstration to rebellion are illegal religious innovations 
(bid’ah) that have no precedence in the religious texts and practice of the 
first generations of Muslims (Salaf). Following a ruler constitutes 
obedience to Allah and the Prophet Muhammad (Quran Surah al-Nisa: 59). 
                                                
37 Original title: ‘Membongkar pemikiran sang Begawan teroris’. 
38 Original title: ‘Menyikapi bom Bali’. 
39 Original title: ‘Mereka adalah teroris’. 
40 Original title: ‘Tidak ada istilah tauhid hakimiyyah/mulkiyyah dalam pandangan Islam’. 
41 Original title: ‘Lagi, tauhid mulkiyyah/hakimiyyah bukan dari Islam’.  
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Instead of rebellion, Muslims should give advice in private and pray for a 
ruler of a country who ruled unjustly as practiced by the companions of the 
prophet, the followers of Sunnah and the Salafi authorities (see ‘The 
religious obligation of compliance with God, the prophet and the ruler’42; 
‘The religious law of rebellion – a obligation of giving advice to a ruler’43). 
 Therefore, it is seen in other postings that the Salafis reject political 
activities aimed at taking over of a country and establishing an Islamic 
state as promoted by the politico-Islamic fundamentalist movements such 
as Ikwan al-Muslimin and Hizb ut-Tahrir. They argue that such political 
activities are un-Islamic and forbidden religious innovations (bid’ah) 
because these will likely bring about disorder and great disadvantages to 
Muslims such as the government restriction of observing their faith. In 
addition, the argument that taking over a country is necessary when its 
ruler does not apply Islamic law is flawed as it resulted from the politico-
fundamentalist groups’ misunderstanding of Islamic state. Referring to Ibn 
Taymiyya (1263-1328), the main early Salafi ideologue, the Salafis believe 
that a country can be regarded as an Islamic state if Muslims constitute the 
majority and they preserve and observe their Islamic faith in public as well 
as in private. It is the presence of Muslims as majority, not political system, 
which determines a country to be regarded as an Islamic state. An Islamic 
state can be a republic country like Indonesia or monarchy like Saudi 
Arabia. In this case, the Salafis assert, Muslims are ordered to cooperate 
with the ruler and prohibited to oppose against him as exemplified by the 
practice of the early Muslim generations (see ‘Caliphate as practiced by the 
prophet’44; ‘Constructing a true Islamic caliphate’45. 
 
C. Waging War against Enemies Online 
The Salafis seem to use the internet as a place to wage a war against those 
regarded as their eternal enemy. Cyberspace has become a new place of 
cyberwars in which off-line enmity and conflict are extended online.  
Through their website, the Salafis criticise and condemn Muslim 
individuals or groups believed as to have violated the purist version of 
manhaj al-salaf (the method of the pious forefathers) in understanding and 
practicing Islam. Their attacks are not only targeted to Muslim groups 
regarded as not the supporters of Salafism, but also to those who 
proclaimed themselves as the Salafis. 
1.   Shi‘ah 
It appears that the Salafis employ the internet as an effective medium to 
attack Syi’ah Muslims (Shiites). In the eyes of the Salafis, the Syi’ahs are 
                                                
42 Original title: ‘Perintah taat kepada Allah, Rasul dan pemerintah’. 
43 Original title: ‘Hukum memberontak- perintah menasehati penguasa’. 
44 Original title: ‘Khilafah di atas manhaj nubuwwah’. 
45 Original title: ‘Mendirikan khalifah islamiyah dengan benar’.  
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not true Muslims as they have allegedly violated some principles of the 
pristine Islam. They reject the Shiite doctrine of taqiyyah, a doctrine that a 
Muslim can conceal his or her faith before those regarded as enemy 
including other Muslims in order to preserve his or her faith and prevent 
himself or himself from harmful treatment. For the Salafis, the doctrine is a 
violation of the true meaning of taqiyyah in that concealing one’s faith can 
only be taken before unbelievers who will likely put him or her in danger if 
she or he reveals his or her faith. Moreover, the Syi’ah attitude of 
disguising faith before other Muslims (non-Syi’ah) indicates that they are 
not true Muslims, but hypocrites (munafiqin). To support their attack, the 
Salafis use particular Quranic verses (al-Nisa: 97-98; Alu Imran: 28; al-Nahl 
106), which they believe deal with true taqiyyah, and refer to their 
ideologues such as Ibn Taymiyyah (see ‘Disclosing the Syi’ah: taqiyyah’46). 
 The Salafis also posted articles condemning the Syi’ah belief in 
mut’ah, a doctrine that a Muslim is permitted to marry a woman, Muslim or 
non-Muslims, for a period of time, and the infallibity of their imams 
(supreme spiritual leaders). They regard the Shi’ah as not the followers of 
the nash (religious texts) as they allegedly have changed the Quran and 
Sunnah for their interests and purposes. The Salafis also believe that Syi’ah 
are not the followers of the Salaf and accuse them of spreading hatred and 
lies about the Salaf, the Prophet’s wives and his companions. Due to these 
violations, the Salafis conclude that it impossible to establish a dialogue 
and rapprochement between the Syi’ah and the Sunni Muslims (see series 
‘Disclosing the Syi’ah: mut’ah marriage’; ‘Worshipping imams’; ‘Hatred 
against the Prophet’s wives’; ‘Fake love of the Prophet’s family (ahl al-
bait)’; ‘Denigrating the Prophet’s companions (sahabah)’; ‘A rejection of 
the Syi’ah doctrine of Mahdi’47). 
 
2.  Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) 
The Salafis posted some articles in their website aimed at attacking 
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL; Liberal Islam Network).48 For the Salafis, the 
idea of religious pluralism promoted by the members of JIL seriously 
contravenes a principle that Islam is the only religion accepted by God. In 
their attempts to unmask what they believe as the JIL’s lies, the Salafis 
refer to the religious texts saying Islam as the final chain of the religious 
                                                
46 Original title: ‘Membongkar kesesatan Syiah: Taqiyyah’. 
47 Original series titles: ‘Membongkar kesesatan Syiah: nikah mut’ah’; ‘Memuja imamnya’; ‘Benci pada istri 
Nabi’; ‘Cinta palsu pada ahlul bait’; ‘Menghina sahabat Nabi’; ‘Al-Quran diubah-ubah’; “Bantahan singkat 
terhadap keyakinan Syiah tentang Mahdi’). 
48 Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network) is a network of young Indonesian intellectuals and 
activists that promote a new interpretation of Islam characterized by following insights: belief in the openness of 
ijtihad (personal or collective (re) interpretation of the religious texts); the relative, open, and plural truth; 
emphasize on the ethical- religious spirit, not the literal meaning of the text; support for minorities and the 
oppressed; and freedom of belief and faith. For details see N.T. B. Harjanto (2003); Hooker (2004) Ali (n.d.); 
Nurdin (2005). 
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transmissions. They argue that Islam as the last revelation encompasses all 
religions brought by previous prophets such as Judaism and Christianity. 
This is not only mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah, but also supported by 
the first Muslim generations and the Salafi authorities. In other words, they 
claim Islam is the only true religion so that the idea which promotes a 
religious unity and calls for a common platform among various religious 
adherents is undoubtedly unacceptable. They call those who support 
religious pluralism, such as the members of JIL, t}a>ghu>t (evil) due to their 
lost of faith in the doctrine of al-wala>’ wa al-barra>’ (loving and supporting 
the fellow Muslims, and deserting and showing enmity to unbelievers) (see 
‘Uncovering the mask of JIL, Ahlus Sunnah shut their mouth’49). 
 In their postings, the Salafis also label the members of JIL as the 
followers of evil (shayt}a>n), the servant of reason (‘aql), neo-Mu‘tazilites, 
and the supporters of the method of unbelievers (kuffa>r) due to their use of 
reason to understand and interpret texts (nas}s}) of the Quran and Sunnah, 
rather than the methods practiced by the Salaf. They consider religious 
pluralism promoted by JIL as “cheap and obsolete ideology” and a 
blasphemy to Islam. For the Salafis, the members of the JIL are 
undoubtedly the supporters of forbidden bid‘ah and constitute the Jewish-
Christian conspiracy to destroy Islam and Muslims. As a result, they 
encourage the ruler of Islamic country to bring the members of JIL to court 
and sentence them to death, if necessary, due to their blasphemous thoughts 
of Islamic principles (see series of ‘Uncovering the mask of JIL: ‘the 
followers and the worshippers of evil’; ‘A call for a religious unity’; ‘the 
true unity of the Salaf’; ‘Open trial of JIL’50). 
 
3.  Hizbut Tahrir (HT) 
The cyberwar is also directed to Hizbut Tahrir (HT; the Liberation Party), a 
transnational fundamentalist movement whose operating arena is politics. 
The Salafis point out that supporters of Hizbut Tahrir are not the true 
followers of the Quran and Sunnah though they claim that they operate 
under the guidance of the two main sources of Islam. They are mistaken, 
the Salafis assert, in that they defy the method of the Salaf as seen in their 
goals and methods to achieve them. The Hizbut  Tahrir use of politics to 
establish a global Islamic state (khila>fah isla>mi>yyah) brings the Salafis to 
accuse them of ignoring the prophet’s method of Islamic propagation. In his 
mission, the Prophet called people to the true monotheism (tawh}i>d) and 
submission to Allah (‘iba>dah), not to political takeover of the existing 
authority or the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Political victory is 
not a goal of the Islamic propagation, but rather as a necessary result of the 
                                                
49 Original title: ‘Membongkar kedok JIL, Ahlus sunnah membungkamnya’.  
50 Original titles: series articles ‘Membongkar kedok JIL: ‘Pengikut dan pemuja iblis’; ‘seruan penyatuan 
agama’; ‘Persatuan hakiki ala Salaf’; ‘Pengadilan terbuka atas mereka’). 
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establishment of society that guided by the Quran and Sunnah. Hizbut 
Tahrir, according to the Salafis, has ignored the core of Islamic mission (a 
call for tawh}i>d), and prioritized its periphery (politics and Islamic state) 
(see ‘Politics that prescribed by shariah, a repudiation of HT’51; ‘The 
prophets’ method of propagation, a repudiation of HT;’52 ‘Uncovering the 
veil of Hizbut Tahrir.’53            
 Their postings reveal that Salafis also attack the high political 
tendency of Hizbut Tahrir. The Salafis view this ideology as a result of 
Hizbut Tahrir’s misperception of Islamic state. They argue that Islamic 
state is not a territory in which Islamic law is applied to all aspects of 
society such as political system and governance as Hizbut Tahrir believes. 
Rather, it is a country where Muslims constitute the majority and they 
observe their religion faithfully, no matter what kind of political system and 
governance is applied. So, the assumption promoted by the supporters of 
Hizbut Tahrir that there is no currently Islamic state (da>r al-Isla>m) so that 
it is a religious obligation to establish an Islamic caliphate expresses their 
ignorance of the Quran, Sunnah and the manhaj al-salaf (see ‘Unmasking 
Hizbut Tahrir – who is it?’54; ‘Terorism in the Islamic perspective- a 
refutation of HT.’55 
 The Salafi attack is further directed to Hizbut Tahrir’s reluctance of 
acknowledging h}adi>th a>h}a>d, a kind of hadi>th (sayings and practices of the 
Prophet Muhammad) that reported by a single companion of the Prophet 
(s}ah}a>bah), as a valid religious source of Islamic doctrines. Referring to a 
fatwa> by Shaykh al-Albani>, the Salafis stress that this doctrine is a 
denigration of the s}ah}a>bah as part of the Salaf whose credibility is not 
questioned. This also indicates that the supporters of Hizbut Tahrir have 
developed religious innovations (bid‘ah). Instead of following the method 
of the Salaf in understanding the h}adi>th, Hizbut Tahrir has followed the 
method of Mu‘tazilah that prioritizes reason over faith (i>ma>n) in 
understanding religious texts (see ‘Fatwa tentang kesesatan Hizbut Tahrir’; 
‘Siapakah Hizbut Tahrir?’; ‘Bantahan ilmiyyah atas kesesatan akidah HT’). 
The Salafis also condemn the Hizbut Tahrir for their cooperation with 
Muslim groups who have defied the method of the Salaf such as Shi‘ah 
saying that it is an expression of their lack of al-wala>’ wa al-barra>’ (a 
doctrine that a Muslim must love and support fellow Muslims, but desert 
and show enmity to unbelievers) (see ‘Uncovering the mask of Hizbut 
Tahrir’56). 
                                                
51 Original title: ‘Politik yang syar’i- bantahan atas HT’. 
52 Original title: ‘Manhaj dakwah para nabi- bantahan atas HT’. 
53 Original titles: ‘Membongkar selubung Hizbut Tahrir’; ‘Membongkar kesesatan Hizbut Tahrir- Khilafah 
Islamiyah’. 
54 Original title: ‘Membongkar kesesatan Hizbut Tahrir’. 
55 Original title: ‘Terorisme dalam timbangan Islam- bantahan atas HT’. 
56 Original title: ‘Membongkar selubung Hizbut Tahrir II’.    
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4.  Ikhwan al-Muslimin (IM) 
In addition, the Salafis employ cyberspace as a place to attack Ikhwan al-
Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood), another transnational fundamentalist 
Muslim movement originated from Egypt. Their attacks are focused 
particularly on Sayyid Qutb, the movement’s ideologue. Qutb believes that 
at the moment there is no Muslim society and Islamic country because 
there is no society or country that appoints Allah as the only ruler, applies 
Islamic law and lives an Islamic life. He called them a modern version of 
jahiliyah (ignorant) society, which existed before the coming of Islam in 
Mecca and was ignorant of the true Islam. He further introduced takfi>r, a 
doctrine that the ruler of a country who does not implement Allah’s rules in 
all aspect of community life can be declared as unbeliever so that he can be 
toppled and replaced by a true Muslim ruler to establish an Islamic state.  
 By posting articles, the Salafis claim that Qut}b’s ideas of takfi>r, 
modern ja>hili>yyah society and Islamic state are clearly misleading. He was 
mistaken when he said that h}a>kimi>yyah (sovereignty) was an important 
element of tawh}i>d (true monotheism). For the Salafis, this resulted from 
Qut}b’s misunderstanding of the Muslim’s creed of La ila>ha illa> Alla>h (there 
is no ‘ilah’ but Allah), in which he reduced the meaning of the word ila>h 
into “the ruler.” This is clearly in contrast with the Salaf who interpreted 
the word as “the only one who has right to be worshiped.” For the Salafis, 
Qut}b’s ideas represent the thinking of the supporters of bid‘ah and reflect 
the influences of Mu‘tazilah, Shi‘ah, and Khawa>rij, the groups that oppose 
the manhaj al-salaf (see ‘The danger of Sayyid Qut}b’s idea of takfi>r’57). 
  
5.  Internal conflict 
It is interesting to note that the Salafis also utilise cyberspace as a place to 
wage a cyberwar against other Salafi groups, but believed no longer 
embrace the true Salafi ways. This use shows that the internet is a place 
where internal conflicts among the Salafi supporters in Indonesia are 
extended into cyberspace. The fragmentation among the Salafis began 
when a group of them were accused of being suru>ris, the supporters of the 
views promoted by Muhammad ibn Suru>r, one of the main proponents of 
politico-Salafis who severely criticised the Saudi government in the case of 
the presence of American troops in the Arabian soil during the Gulf War. 
This group developed da‘wah (propagation) activities by establishing two 
Salafi foundations, Yayasan al-Sofwah (al-Sofwah Foundation) led by 
Muhamad al-Khalaf (?) and Majlis al-Turas al-Islami (the Assembly of 
Islamic Heritage) directed by Abu Nida. These foundations were believed 
as to have established links with overseas foundations that support Ibn 
                                                
57 Original title: ‘Bahaya pemikiran takfir Sayyid Qutub’. 
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Surur, namely al-Muntada al-Islami Foundation of London and al-
Jam’iyyah Ihya al-Turats of Kuwait (see ‘A testimony of Ustadz 
Muhammad Umar as-Sewed’58; ‘Ihya ut Turats is a deviant foundation’59; 
‘Disclosing the crimes of Ihya Turas, the enemy of the Salafis’60; ‘The 
danger of JI network of Kuwait and al-Turas’61).  
 Through their website, the Salafis have focused their attacks on 
these two foundations. Umar as-Sewed in his postings asserts that al-
Sofwah Foundation does not follow the manhaj al-salaf as it is closely 
affliliated to al-Muntada Foundation of London led by Muhammad ibn 
Surur. Sewed refers to Syaikh Rabi’ al-Madkhaly, a Salafi authority in the 
Middle East, who said that “if the foundation (al-Sofwah) is similar to al-
Muntada of London, we think, it will be a major enemy for dakwah Salaf 
movement in Indonesia”. He argues that those involved in al-Sofwah 
Foundation are not the Salafis because they support Ibn Surur and Ikwan al-
Muslimin, but they pretend to be Salafis. To supports his arguments, Sewed 
provides evidence that al-Sofwah’s deviation from the manhaj al-salaf is 
seen in its attempts to publish al-Bayan, a periodical that is published by al-
Muntada of London, and books written by Sururi authorities, support the 
activities of groups regarded as ahl al-bid’ah (the supporters of religious 
innovations) such as Tarekat Sufi,62 Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera,63 and invite the Sururi 
authorities to give lectures in Indonesia such as Ibrahim al-Duwasy (see ‘A 
testimony of Muhammad Umar as-Sewed’64). 
 The extension of internal conflict into cyberspace can also be seen 
in the Salafis’ attack on the Majelis al-Turas al-Islamy of Indonesia. The 
Salafis accuse those involved in the foundation of being deviant from the 
true method of the Salaf and following the methods adopted by Ikhwan al-
Muslimin. They are considered as heretics (mubtadi’) as they are inclined to 
support the Sururi ideas by getting themselves involved in political 
activities and parliament. This is supported by a fact that the foundation 
has established a network with Jam’iyyah Ihya al-Turas of Kuwait, a 
foundation that supports the politico-Salafi movement led by Abdul 
Rahman Abd al-Khaliq. Hence, the Salafis call those who support the 
Majlis al-Turas of Indonesia ‘the puppets (boneka) of Abdur al-Rahman 
Abd al-Khaliq’. Jamiyyah al-Turas of Kuwait provided Majlis al-Turas with 
                                                
58 Original title: ‘Persaksian al-Ustadz Muhammad Umar as-Sewed’. 
59 Original title: ‘Ihya ut Turats menyimpang dalam manhaj’. 
60 Original title: ‘Membongkar kejahatan Ihya Turas – musuh Salafiyyin’.  
61 Original title: ‘Bahaya jaringan JI dari Kuwait dan al-Turas’.  
62 Sufi Tarekat (Islamic mysticism brotherhood; Sufism; tasawwuf) is a school of thought that promotes the 
inner or mystical dimensions of Islam. See e.g. Godlas (2000). 
63 PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [Prosperous Justice Party]) is an Indonesian political party whose 
ideology is Islam and founded in 1998. It has a close association with Ikhwan al-Muslimin and other campus-
based dakwah movements in Indonesia. The party won 7.3% of the popular vote and 45 out of 550 seats in the 
2004 legislative election making it the seventh-largest party in parliament.  
64 Original title: ‘Persaksian al-Ustadz Muhammad as-Sewed’. 
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considerable financial support by which the latter could promote the Sururi-
Ikhwani ideology in Indonesia. For the Salafis, the fund allocated by 
Jamiyya al-Turas of Kuwait has brought about the fragmentation and 
conflict among the Salafis in Indonesia, which is highly prohibited 
according to the Quran and Sunnah (see ‘Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq and 
Ihya al-Turas’65‘; ‘Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, a heretic’66’; ‘Questions 
and answers about Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq and al-Turas’67; ‘Ihya al-
Turas - Ulama do not recommend it’68; ‘Ihya al-Turas is a deviant 
foundation – the puppet of Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq’69). 
 Moreover, the Salafis accuse the Ihya al-Turas of Kuwait and Majlis 
al-Turas al-Islami of Indonesia of having breached the principles of the 
manhaj al-salaf because of the following reasons. First, they do not obey the 
ruler as they establish their own system of governance such as pledging an 
oath to their leaders (bai’at) and developing underground system cells for 
recruiting particular members who are responsible to particular regions or 
mosques. Second, the supporters of the two foundations do not follow the 
Salaf’s enmity and isolation (al-bara) of those regarded as the deviants from 
the manhaj al-salaf as seen in their invitation to these people to give 
lectures and attend seminars. Finally, those involved in these foundations 
do not follow the manhaj al-salaf in dealing with the supporters of Salafism 
(salafiyyin). They do not show their support and love (al-wala) to the ulama 
of the manhaj al-salaf by not inviting them to give lectures and advice and 
they bring the salafiyyin into conflict and fragmentation through their funds 
(see ‘Disclosing the crimes of Ihya al-Turas – loyalty to the ruler’70). 
Therefore, the Salafis remind the true followers of the Salaf of the 
danger of these foundations and ban publishers and bookshops to publish 
and sell works by the supporters of these foundations. To support this, the 
Salafis refer again to the fatwas issued by the Salafi authorities in the 
Middle East such as Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, Ubaid al-Jabiri, 
Muhammad bin Hadi al-Madkhali, and Muqbil bin Hadi (see Fatwas on 
Ihya al-Turas’71; Ihya al-Turas is a deviant foundation – khilafiyah and 
ijtihaidiyah’72 ‘An open call for publishers and bookshop owners’73; ‘Beware 
of al-Sofwah and Ihya al-Turas’74). 
 
 
                                                
65 Original title: ‘Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq dan Ihya Turas’. 
66 Original title: ‘Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq – seorang mubtadi’. 
67 Original title: ‘Soal-jawab tentang Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq & at-Turas’.  
68 Original title: ‘Ihya Turas – ulama tidak merekomendasi’.  
69 Original title: ‘Ihya Turas menyimpang – boneka Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq’.  
70 Original title: ‘Membongkar kejahatan Ihya’ut Turas – taat pemerintah’.  
71 Original title: ‘Ihya ut Turas menyimpang dalam manhaj – fatwa ulama’. 
72 Original title: ‘Ihya ut Turas menyimpang dalam manhaj – khilaf & ijtihadiyah’. 
73 Original title: ‘Seruan terbuka bagi penerbit dan pemilik toko buku’. 
74 Original title: ‘Hati-hati dengan al-Sofwah dan Ihya Turas’. 
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CONCLUSION  
An examination of the Salafi use of the internet reveals that cultural spaces 
are affected by the internet through communal processes, in which the 
Salafi community adopts and adapts the internet to fulfil its religious 
purposes. In these processes, the Salafis modify the internet and place it in 
their communal context. Particularly, they adjust the internet through a 
localization process within the framework of their network and regulations. 
This works in two ways: while the Salafis localize the global force of the 
internet, they themselves are being reshaped to become a part of a 
globalizing world. This interaction represents the processes of “cultured 
technology,”75 appropriation of the global media and spiritualizing 
technology, which not only facilitate the Salafis to preserve their existence 
within their traditional boundaries, but also culturally transform the 
internet into a new type of technology that serves the needs and interests of 
the Salafi community. 
Through these processes, as seen in their use of the website, the 
Salafis embrace the internet as a means to communicate and promote their 
Salafi identities. More specifically, the Salafis use the internet as an 
ideological tool by which they communicate their fundamentalist ideology 
and disseminate the Salafi da‘wah (mission) to wider audiences. It appears 
that the Salafis employs the internet as a polemical means in that they wage 
a cyberwar against those are regarded as to have violated the authentic 
Islam as set by the Salaf (the pious predecessors), such as the Shi‘ites, 
Ikhwan al-Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir. Cyberspace becomes a new place of 
cyberwars in which off-line enmity and conflict are extended online. In 
addition, for the Salafis, internet plays a role as a medium for responding to 
contemporary issues of local and global societies. Through their website, 
the Salafis express their views and concerns over global issues such as 
conflicts and economical and political instability facing countries of the 
Muslim world as well as local issues such as Tsunami that struck Indonesia 
in 2004. This reflects the paradox of transnational movements like 
Salafism; it operates across national borders and challenges the nation-state 
territorially as well as ideologically, but cannot ignore the current issues of 
the country where it operates as its attempts to scale up its influences or at 
least preserve its presence in a local (national) arena. Finally, the Salafi 
community utilizes the internet for building linkage and networks. They use 
cyberspace as a medium to maintain solidarity and develop local (national) 
and global networks among the local and global supporters of Salafism. 
                                                
75 Karine Barzilai-Nahon and Gad Barzilai, “Cultured Technology,” The Information Society, 21 (2005): 25-
40. 
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This indicates that a local Salafi network can have global effects and a 
global Salafi network can have influences on a local Salafi community. 
The ways the Salafis make use of the internet to articulate their 
identities also exemplify the process of “spiritualizing the internet.” 
Through this process, the Salafis adopt and confer a kind of religious 
legitimacy on the internet for their spiritual purposes and values. This may 
involve a process of negotiation between the Salafi religious worldviews 
and the ethos of the internet as a product of the profane worldviews. As 
Campbell says, it “highlights that technology is embedded in a social 
process of negotiation between individuals and groups who inevitably shape 
them towards their own desire and values.” What distinguishes the Salafis, 
or religious communities in general, from the non-religious groups in this 
process is that the former endorses and utilizes the new media for their 
needs and interests within “a spiritually rich worldview with meanings and 
values that might be absent” in the latter groups (Kluver and Cheong 2007: 
1125). 
As a case study, the findings of this study may pertain only to the 
interplay between the Islamic movements and the internet. And as a textual 
analysis, this study may suffer from the lack of empirical explanation and 
statistical data. But, I believe that the strength of this study lies most in its 
depth and its position as a clear evidence of the coexistence between 
religion and modernization. I also believe that the findings of this study 
reflect the same patterns of the internet use by most of religious 
communities. 
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